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Abstract 
The reaction of economic geographers to the World Bank's World Development Report 2009 
– Reshaping Economic Geography – has so far been a corporatist turf-protecting exercise. 
The report has been dismissed as the work of economists who completely ignore a rich 
tradition of work by ‘proper’ economic geographers. However, this negative response has 
prevented geographers from engaging constructively with the World Bank’s analysis and 
proposals. In this note I argue that, while the report presents an accurate diagnosis of recent 
development trends and should be praised for its flexibility in providing numerous policy 
alternatives, geographers can significantly contribute to promote a discussion around two key 
issues in the report: its treatment of institutions and its recommendation of spatially-blind 
policies. 
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Welcoming the World Development Report 2009 
 
I have been involved in a series of workshops where the World Bank's World 
Development Report 2009, entitled Reshaping Economic Geography (World Bank 
2009) – henceforth the report – was discussed. The most interesting gatherings included 
a mixture of academic economists, policy-makers, and international organisation 
officials. Such workshops gave me the chance of seeing my colleagues in, using 
Overman’s (2004) words, economic geography ‘proper’ defend the discipline against 
what many consider an intrusive incursion by economists into our internal affairs.  
 
A ‘token proper economic geographer’ was often invited to give a ‘geographer’s view’ 
of the report. The arguments of successive geographers were cut from the same cloth 
and echo many of the already published criticisms. They can be summarised as follows. 
First, the report is the work of economists, overlooking or eschewing the work of 
geographers (Rigg et al. 2009, 128; Mariganti et al. 2009, 44). No geographers have 
been involved in the panels of advisers (World Bank 2009, 15) and virtually none is 
cited (Rigg et al. 2009: 130; Mariganti et al. 2009, 47). Second, the report seeks 
simplicity at the expense of complexity, obscuring diversity and leading to a 
monochromatic view of the world (Bryceson et al. 2009, 723). The outcome is a report 
full of simplifications and crude typologies that, “if taken too far, become absurd 
abstractions or even dangerous ones if translated into policy” (Rigg et al 2009, 131). 
Hence “the Report appears, to geographers at least, academically narrow and 
historically shallow” (Rigg et al. 2009, 130) and devoid of “the nuances that 
geographers usually deploy” (Bryceson 2009, 723).  
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The desire for simplicity in the report also hides a degree of ‘intellectual provincialism’ 
(Scott 2009, 58). The report closely follows the ‘new economic geography’ (NEG) 
approach, disregarding not just the work of geographers, but also that of less ‘orthodox 
economists’ (Scott 2009,584). This supposedly blinkered approach is extensible to its 
neglect of alternative methods: qualitative analysis is considered merely anecdotal (Rigg 
et al. 2009, 131). 
 
The criticisms also retake the ‘been there, done that’ feel of Ron Martin’s (1999) initial 
critique of NEG. Accordingly, the report gives “the impression that economic 
geography began in the last decade or so” (Rigg et al. 2009, 130) ignoring “the long-
standing professional experience of previous agglomeration modellers from geography 
who know all too well the complexities of urban growth and welfare” (Rigg et al. 2009, 
130).  
 
In the extreme, the authors are even accused of intellectual dishonesty, by only resorting 
to the cases which support their preferred views and “avoiding citation of data that 
would undermine the explanatory power of new economic geography agglomeration 
theory” (Bryceson et al. 2009, 731). 
 
One final criticism suggests that, had the report been written by geographers, it would 
have been much more comprehensive and inclusive. The social, political, and 
environmental dimensions of development would have been covered, alongside 
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institutions, path dependency, gender, ethnicity, intergenerational issues, social 
exclusion, local elites, and other currently excluded aspects (Bryceson et al. 2009; Scott, 
2009). 
 
In sum, geography has welcomed the report with the adage coined by Martin (1999, 67) 
for the NEG : what is there “is not that new, and it is most certainly not geography”. 
 
What has the report done to deserve this? 
 
While, individually, these arguments may have – except that of intellectual dishonesty – 
some merit, collectively they represent an unhelpful critique of the report. The lack of 
constructive engagement with such an influential document may simply be another bout 
of what Duranton and Rodríguez-Pose (2005) call ‘lions and butterflies’: that is, the 
incapacity of geographers and economists to address issues of common interest in a 
constructive and non-corporatist manner. But this reaction, rather than bringing the 
geographers’ case to the fore, is hurting more than helping the discipline on three fronts: 
a) in our capacity to influence policy-making; b) because of the thinness and 
reversibility of our criticisms; and c) because we may be choosing the wrong target, as 
the report is, to the outside world, a solid and, given the scale of the task undertaken, 
rather reasonable document, which is casting economic geography ‘tout court’ into the 
policy limelight. I will treat these three counts in turn. 
 
  6
The report, geographers, and policy-makers. 
 In presentations of the report, I always found the reaction of policy-makers the most 
interesting. Both because of their position as ‘neutrals’ in the economists vs. 
geographers divide, and because of their capacity to transform academic advice into real 
policy. At these meetings the ‘token’ geographer is invited to comment on a 
presentation of the report. Following the body language of policy-makers during these 
exchanges has been one of my secret past-times. Prior to the engagement, the mood is 
of expectation. Most of the policy-makers are already familiar with the contents of the 
report and aware – this being the World Bank after all – that it has been written by 
economists. They are eager for the geographer to show her or his wares and may even 
secretly cherish the idea of a geographer putting some egg of the World Bank’s face.  
 
The presentation of the report usually involves a reproduction of its key findings and 
policy recommendations. The geographer is then given between ten and twenty minutes 
to comment. The expectations rise. The first punch comes quickly: the report is the 
work of economists who ignore a rich tradition of scholarship by ‘proper’ economic 
geographers. Fair enough, thinks the policy-maker. Then come the criticisms of (2) 
oversimplification, of (3) selective use of methods and cases, of (4) disregarding the 
political, social, and environmental dimensions, and so on until completing the long list 
of ‘affronts’ to the dignity of geography ‘proper’. By the time the more constructive 
engagement begins, three quarters of the time allocated have passed and, alas, few are 
still paying attention. While the first complaint may bemuse the listener and the second 
intrigue her, the third or fourth complaint become a source of frustration. The body 
language of the audience starts to change. First, the eyes begin to roll, then the body 
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gets twitchy, and finally the heads drop. Engagement with substance only arrives when 
most of the audience is already buried in memos for their next meeting. The substantial 
arguments are thus lost, doing more harm than good to our capacity to influence 
policies.  
 
Are our criticisms criticism-proof? 
An additional stumbling block for geographers is whether our criticisms of the report 
are, in turn, criticism-proof – or as Buckley and Buckley (2009) indicate, whether they 
are both valid and significant. The problem is that they are easily revocable.  
 
It is undoubtedly true that the report ignores the work of economic geographers. But this 
is mutual. As Duranton and Rodríguez-Pose (2005) show, the level of ignorance by 
economic geographers of the work of geographical economists is marginally lower than 
vice versa. The report may also be selective in its choice of cases, but given its breadth, 
this is inevitable. Similarly, in the criticisms of the report, the cases chosen are those 
more likely to contradict its findings. The question is thus not whether the cases are the 
most favorable, but whether the agglomeration tendencies prevalent throughout the 
report are the exception and not the rule. And here even the most recalcitrant 
geographer would have to agree this is not the case. 
 
The criticism of simplicity reflects economists’ fondness of parsimony. While 
parsimony has its risks, there are also “gains from coordinating targets and instruments” 
(Buckley and Buckley 2009, 2810) and parsimonious objectives may facilitate policy 
  8
learning and adaptation to different contexts. Strong diversity in policy 
recommendations reflecting place-based characteristics may, in contrast, easily derive in 
relativism and in the impossibility of policy transfer and adaptability.  
 
But perhaps the most perplexing criticism is that of the report’s blatant ignorance of the 
political, social, and environmental dimensions of development. This is by choice and 
not by error. As noted, “to keep the Report focused, several important aspects of the 
spatial transformations do not get the attention they would in a fuller study. The main 
aspects not considered […] are the social and environmental effects of a changing 
economic geography” (World Bank 2009, 34). The authors thus acknowledge the 
importance of these aspects but prefer to concentrate on the economic dimension. 
Hence, such criticisms reflect what ‘proper’ economic geographers believe the report 
should have been about and not what it is about.  
 
The final argument that had geographers written the report it would have been more 
inclusive – while possibly true – would have generated other problems. Given that just 
four published commentaries of the report by economic geographers have generated 
more than twelve proposals of topics which ought to have been covered, geographers 
could have ended up with a report simply skimming over the issues it intended to 
address. 
 
On the choice of target and its quality 
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The choice of target may also not be the best for two reasons, one dealing with the 
impact and diffusion of the report, the other with its quality. Regarding the former, 
although, from a geographer’s perspective, the title Reshaping economic geography 
may be unfortunate, the report has cast economic geography into the limelight and is 
pushing policy-makers to think hard about the spatial implications of their actions. It 
represents an excellent opportunity for ‘proper’ economic geographers to showcase our 
research and have a real go at influencing policy. But the vitriolic reaction to the report 
is obscuring the significance of our message to the point of almost making it irrelevant. 
 
Regarding the issue of quality, dismissing the report outright is again counterproductive. 
To the independent reader – s/he with no particular turf to defend – the report is an 
extremely well-crafted document. It is compact, instructive and informative, and reads 
well. Its tripartite divisions of scale (local, national, and international), development 
dimensions (density, distance, and division), and solutions (institutions, infrastructure, 
and interventions) creates a sort of Rubik’s Cube of development problems and 
solutions at different geographical scales which allows both for a simple understanding 
of the complexity of development and provides, simultaneously, basic guidelines but 
also an array of options about how to address development issues in different parts of 
the world. The ‘development in 3-D’ idea (World Bank, 2009: XIX) becomes extremely 
appealing and contributes to make economic geography sexy. 
 
In terms of content, the report presents a generally accurate diagnosis of development 
problems. Development is territorially uneven and economic activity increasingly 
agglomerated in urban areas, often benefiting the densest and richest regions within 
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countries the world over. It is also correct in highlighting that agglomerated areas 
usually do better than sparsely populated ones and that size matters: large cities do 
better than medium-sized cities and so on (Henderson and Wang 2005; World Bank 
2009, 118). Of the 42 countries for which I have gathered subnational GDP per capita 
time-series data – including most of the large developed and emerging countries – only 
Brazil represents a genuine case of reduction of territorial disparities. In all other cases, 
the tendency is either towards stability or increasing divergence, with emerging 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia – led by 
China and India – witnessing the steepest rises in territorial polarisation (Rodríguez-
Pose and Gill 2006). And polarisation in low and middle income countries is much 
higher than in developed ones (i.e. subnational disparities in Thailand are close to nine 
times those found in Australia or the US). 
 
The report is also spot on in stressing that uneven territorial development may not 
necessarily be ‘bad’ for future prosperity and for improving the life chances of 
individuals, especially if we are concerned with interpersonal and not interterritorial 
inequality. It is also right in underlining that development policies have had, at best, 
limited results and that those areas which have done best tend to be those more 
accessible to or integrated with, economic cores.  
 
But perhaps the greatest novelty of the report lies in its policy recommendations. Not 
because they are particularly valid or because I share them – which I don’t – but 
because behind a façade of simplicity they hide a potential for enormous diversity. The 
spatially-blind institutions solution for one-dimensional problems; add connective 
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infrastructure for two-dimensional issues; add spatially-targeted intervention for three-
dimensions (World Bank 2009, 23-24) combines the simplicity which pleases decision-
makers with the novelty, for an economic policy document, of allowing a multiplicity of 
combinations of interventions, depending on the scale and dimension of the problem. 
This ‘development in 3-D approach’ ought to please ‘proper’ economic geographers, 
who have been long advocating a greater responsiveness by public intervention to 
different territorial conditions. 
 
A different form of engagement: institutions and spatially-blind 
policies 
 
Does this mean that I agree with everything in the report? Not in the least. While I find 
the gist of the analysis, by and large, correct, I feel uncomfortable with sections of the 
analysis and thoroughly dispute its policy recommendations.  
 
On the analysis, I believe the report makes too many assumptions which are 
unaccounted for and which reflect a certain voluntarism. This voluntarism pervades the 
first few chapters. I am particularly uncomfortable with the assumption – also noted by 
Mariganti et al. (2009) – that there is a unique Kuznetsian economic development path. 
As mentioned in the report, “there is no reason to expect that, when [developing 
countries] prosper, other parts of the world will not experience the same patterns 
[experienced by developed countries in the past] – a rising concentration in some 
industries, before overflowing to their neighbors” (World Bank 2009,10). However, this 
is never properly demonstrated and the world today differs significantly from 19th 
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century Europe. Moreover, development trajectories have differed from one place to 
another and at different geographical scales (e.g. Wade 1991; Chang 2002), limiting the 
certainty that that any past development paths may be reproduced. This issue, while 
mentioned in the report, is never properly addressed (World Bank 2009, 120-1). 
 
This voluntarism also permeates the idea that agglomeration will result in better 
opportunities for all and, eventually, in lower inequalities. On page 39, it is stated that 
the report is not anti-equity. It may be true, but it is by no means certain and is again not 
demonstrated. Even the examples chosen to illustrate this point contradict this 
assumption. Greater population migration and agglomeration in the US has been 
associated with lower territorial disparities than in the EU, but has not resulted in lower 
social inequality (World Bank 2009, 39). If this reasoning is transferred to the 
developing world, massive rural-urban migration will not be the solution against social 
inequality, but a transformation of what has fundamentally been a rural-urban problem 
into an intra-urban one. Here the criticisms by geographers are accurate: rural-urban 
migration in Africa, Latin America, or Asia may just reduce spatial disparities at the 
expense of greater and pervasive social inequality (Bryceson et al. 2009; Mariganti et al. 
2009). But contrary to the critics’ views, this trend rather than the exception may be the 
rule: there is no evidence that economic agglomeration in cities in the developed world 
leads to greater social equality (i.e. Sassen 1991; Florida 2003). Given the above, it is 
surprising that the timing of rural-urban migration does not command greater attention. 
While I would not go as far as Scott (2009, 585) in disagreeing with the report’s 
“implicit position that rural-to-urban migration in developing countries should probably 
be allowed to accelerate”, a thorough discussion of the implications in time of such a 
massive movement of people is necessary.  
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Voluntarism is also a feature of the report’s policy solutions.  NEG posits that 
improvements in transport infrastructure may accelerate economic agglomeration, 
which may benefit overall economic dynamism but, as discussed above, not result in 
lower social inequality. And the returns to economic integration are likely to differ 
substantially when Burkina Fasso integrates in ECOWAS than when Mexico or central 
and eastern Europe integrate in NAFTA and the EU respectively. Even greater 
integration with advanced territories is no panacea for development and prosperity. The 
cases of state-building in 19th century Italy or late 20th century Germany – despite 
claims to the contrary on page 235 of the report – represent evidence of the difficulties 
of integrating economic uneven, although relatively culturally homogeneous spaces 
(Trigilia 1992;Quehenberger 2000).   
 
Another issue in the report is that the key concepts of agglomeration and distance are 
dealt in a monolithical way. Agglomeration is treated as if all types of agglomeration 
were equally good, when contributions by economic geographers and cognate 
researchers have shown that different types of agglomerations yield diverse outcomes. 
Qualitative (e.g. Markusen 1996; Iammarino and McCann 2006) and quantitative (e.g. 
Frenken et al. 2007; Boschma et al. 2009) analyses have demonstrated that the type and 
composition of clusters and their relationships to the outside world determine whether 
agglomeration and economic dynamism will prevail. NEG has also focused on this issue 
(e.g. Duranton and Puga 2005), making the monolithical treatment of agglomeration 
even more striking. Distance is equated to geographical distance, yet evolutionary 
geographers (e.g. Boschma 2005; Torre and Rallet 2005) have defended that other types 
of distance – cognitive, organizational, institutional, and social – may not only affect the 
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relevance of geographical distance, but also radically alter its influence on the location 
of economic activity. While these ideas are still controversial, it would have been worth 
exploring them, as distance is one of the three articulating dimensions of the report. 
 
My main concern with the report lies, however, not in its assumptions or in its treatment 
of agglomeration and distance, but in its handling of institutions which, in turn, leads to 
what, in my view, is its greatest weakness: the recommendation of spatially-blind 
policies. 
 
Institutions are, if taken at face value, one of the stars of the report. They appear 
everywhere: from the Foreword by the World Bank’s President Robert Zoellick (World 
Bank 2009, xiii) to the last three chapters. This is no surprise. Economists have made 
substantial inroads into showing that institutions may matter more for development than 
alternative factor endowments (e.g. Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson 2006). 
The institutions economists talk about are basically formal institutions and, in particular, 
the rule of law, and the protection of property rights. However, while these institutions 
are of capital importance for economic development, they fail to capture why territories 
with similar formal institutions often develop at radically different rates. By bringing 
informal institutions – and more specifically the relationship between formal and 
informal institutions (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2006) – to the fore, geographers are 
making a substantial contribution in areas where economists have struggled: in 
understanding how place-based interactions between formal and informal institutions 
shape economic development in complex ways (e.g. Amin and Thomas 1996; Storper 
1997; Cooke and Morgan 1998; Gertler 2003). Yet the report adopts a simpler 
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definition of institutions than that of geographers or even economists. Institutions are 
equated to “policies that are spatially-blind in their design and should be universal in 
their coverage” (World Bank 2009, 22) and include “regulations affecting land, labor, 
and international trade and such social services as education, health, and water and 
sanitation financed through tax and transfer mechanisms” (ibid, 22-23) or, in another 
formulation, law and order, basic services, and macro economic stability (ibid, 202).  
 
This definition of institutions leads to the view that development is best achieved 
through spatially-blind policies, that is “policies that are designed without explicit 
consideration to space” (ibid, 24). While spatially-blind policies are indeed necessary in 
order to create the conditions for sustainable economic activity, once basic formal 
institutions are in place, the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes 
becomes much more complex, fuzzy, and difficult to isolate. There are significant 
differences in the formal and informal institutional structure among territories and in the 
way these institutions operate and function, yet pinpointing the effect of specific 
institutions on development is difficult. Most econometric analyses about the impact of 
formal institutions on development in advanced countries find that the overall effects of 
institutions on economic activity and welfare tend to be negligible. This may be a 
consequence of inadequate proxies, of the fact that different institutional arrangements 
in different geographical contexts can lead to similar economic outcomes, or that, 
beyond a certain threshold, the role of formal institutions – and thus of spatially-blind 
policies – may be limited (or a combination of the three). Hence, the interaction of 
spatially-blind institutions with transport infrastructure and economic integration is 
likely to yield radically different economics outcomes in different institutional settings. 
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No wonder that proposing spatially-blind institutions clashes with other reports which 
have treated institutions differently, leading to opposite policy recommendations: place-
based strategies. The 2009 Barca Report on the reform of the European Cohesion Policy 
advocates the adaptation of development strategies to local conditions as a means “to 
reduce persistent inefficiency (underutilisation of the full potential) and inequality (share 
of people below a given standard of well-being and/or extent of interpersonal 
disparities) in specific places, through the promotion of bundles of integrated, place-
tailored public goods and services, designed and implemented by eliciting and 
aggregating local preferences and knowledge through participatory political 
institutions, and by establishing linkages with other places” (Barca 2009, 5). The same 
approach is adopted by the OECD in its 2009 report How regions grow. These reports 
posit that even the best spatially-blind development strategy can be undermined by poor 
institutional environments. Starting with the Italian Mezzogiorno (e.g. Trigilia 1992), 
where adverse institutions have repeatedly derailed interventions along the three pillars 
proposed in the report (spatially-blind institutions, infrastructure, and economic 
integration), the cases where institutional failure has contributed to transform good 
policies into substandard ones are legion. Had institutions, in general, and informal 
institutions, in particular, been dealt with in a more encompassing and comprehensive 
way, the policy recommendations of the report may have been different. 
 
Conclusions   
Ron Martin asked in 2001 why geographers had such a little influence on public policy. 
His main suggestion was that much economic geography conducted by ‘proper’ 
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economic geographers was of little practical relevance for policy. In this paper I have 
argued that the ‘policy turn’ that he pleaded for has taken place and that economic 
geographers are conducting research that is novel and of extreme policy relevance. This 
research complements rather than opposes the research of geographical and spatial 
economists on the other side of the disciplinary boundary. The same could be said vice 
versa.   
 
However, the impact of the work of ‘proper’ economic geographers on important policy 
documents, such as the WDR 2009, remains limited. The reason for this lies not in the 
quality of geographers’ research, but in a combination of path dependent Realpolitik 
power structures – economists are a larger and more powerful group and their research 
commands greater media attention and policy influence – with our failure to engage 
constructively with other groups interested in spatial issues. The WDR 2009 is, albeit in 
a peculiar and contorted way, contributing to feed the interest of policy-makers for the 
work of ‘proper’ economic geographers. Yet, it has been taken by many colleagues both 
as a lost opportunity and as an unwelcomed and unsolicited interference by a 
disciplinary foe in affairs that we consider our own. I would argue that the lost 
opportunity lies not in the report but in our collective failure to engage with it in a 
positive way and to further feed the interest of policy-makers on the issues it treats. The 
reaction to the report by economic geographers has so far been a futile corporatist turf-
protecting exercise which is damaging the projection of our research to the outside 
world. Unless we want to spend the next 31 years awaiting another important policy 
document to attract such attention to economic geography – whether of the economics 
or the geography type – we better put our fifteen minutes in the limelight to better use. 
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